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CORPUS JURIS ROBOTICUM*
by RAYMOND AUGUST
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since Unimation sold the first commercial robot in 19611, the production and utilization of robots has become widespread. Depending on
how one defines a robot, there are between 15,0002 and 80,0003 robots in
the world today. More than one half of these robots are in Japan. The
remaining one half is divided with rough equality between the United
States and Western Europe 4 and their numbers are increasing. Robot
5
population is growing at a staggering 35 percent each year.
In January 1985, the U.S. Census Bureau began to keep track of robots because of this electronic population explosion. Thomas
Mesenbourg, Assistant Census Bureau Chief, explains the Bureau's interest: "It's an area that's growing rapidly and is expected to grow even
6
more rapidly in the next five to ten years."
Robots are being used in both the workplace and the home. Volkswagen has some 550 robots working in its automobile plants7 , General
Electric is manufacturing seven different models for use in all types of
assembly plants,8 and the Health Company's "Hero 1 Personal Robot" is
proving to be popular with Rolls Royce.9 Most of these industrial ro* Corpus Juris Roboticum-The Body of Robot Law. This work describes the legal
status and problems for robots as of mid-MCMLXXXV.
1. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, INDUSTRIAL RoBOTS: THEIR ROLE IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 19, n.3 (1983) [hereinafter INDUSTRIAL
ROBOTS).
2. M. THRING, ROBOTS & TELECHIRS 13 (1983).
3. INDUSTRIAL ROBOTS, supra note 1, at 18-28.

4. Id.
5. Futurists see Growth in Robot Population,N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1984, at A16, col.

6.
6. Richburn, Census Bureau to Begin Count of U.S. Robots, Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1984,
at A21, col.3.
7. G.E. is About to Take a Big Step in Robotics, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 8, 1982, at 31.
8. Id. at 32. See G. LANDSTROM, INDUSTRIAL ROBoT-A SURVEY (1972) and P. BERGER, THE STATE OF THE ART ROBOT CATALOGUE (1984) for summaries of robots that are
available in the Marketplace.
9. Robots Toddlingfrom FactoriesToward Home and Office: "Dumb" Robots Selling
to Rolls Royce Crowd, Christian Scientist Monitor, Mar. 31, 1982, at 11, col. 1.
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bots are simple stationary mechanical devices with electronic controls
that allow them to be reprogrammed as their jobs change. Others are
mobile and capable of undertaking dangerous tasks that humans need
not perform.
One of the most dramatic assignments recently given a robot was
the British Army's enlistment of a remote controlled robot nicknamed
"Wheelbarrow". Armed with a shotgun, this unit knocked down the
door of London's Libyan Embassy on April 30, 1984 and ended a twoweek police siege of that building.' 0
II.

THE ROBOT THREAT

While robot enthusiasts laud these mechanical wonders, others fear
them. The most commonly perceived robot threat is economic in nature. More specifically, robots pose the threat of job displacement.
These fears are reinforced by commentators who paint an economically
gloomy picture for laborers. John Young of the Cybernetics Laboratory
at the University of Ashton, England, predicts that "[t]he economic consequences and the social consequences of the introduction into industry
of the general-purpose robot will be extreme.... Human beings will
have little time to adapt slowly to the robotic revolution."" In addition,
Adam Osborne, inventor of the portable computer, has written that
"'Of all the jobs in the industrial world today.., perhaps half will be
eliminated during the next twenty-five years.' "12
To protect themselves from the threat of replacement, labor unions
have demanded concessions from corporate management. The Nissan
Motor Company, Japan's second largest automobile manufacturer,
signed an agreement in 1983 with its 47,000 member union that forbids
the company from either dismissing of laying off workers when it integrates robots or other sophisticated technology into its plants. 13 In the
United States, the International Association of Machinists has drafted a
"Technology Bill of Rights" that guarantees that "'Displaced workers
shall be entitled to training, retraining and subsequent ...reemployment.' "14 To pay for this program, the union is demanding that an
"automation tax" be imposed on robots and other equipment that elimi10. British Blast Open Libyan Embassy to Search Building, L.A. Times, May 1, 1984,

§ 1, at 1, col.4.
11. J. YOUNG, ROBOTICS 291 (1973).
12. Miller, Tools and Monsters, THE NEW

REPUBLIC,

May 16, 1981, at 31 quoting A.

OSBORNE,RUNNING WILD: THE NEXT INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION.

13. At Nissan Motor Co. Robots Can't Rub Out the Jobs of Humans, Wall St. J., Mar.
2, 1983, § 2, at 33, col. 5 (E. ed.).
14. Kvzela, IAM Envisions a Tax on Automation, INDUSTRY WEEK May 30, 1983, at
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15
nate jobs.

On a more primitive level, workers have responded to the threat of
job displacement with acts of sabotage. Like their English counterparts
who attempted to destroy new textile machines at the outset of the Industrial revolution because they seemed to be taking away jobs, modern
workers are using similar tactics against robots. Gerrit Nijland, a professor of industrial robotics at the Berenschot Management Training
Center in The Netherlands, recently studied worker resistance in his
country. He found that the most common sabotage took the form of
slowing down machines by feeding them parts out of the proper order.
In other cases, workers repaired robots incorrectly, mislaid spare parts
or put sand into the machines' lubricating oil. By carrying out such6
acts, workers hoped to create management dissatisfaction with robots.1
Another author suggests that worker sabotage can be avoided
through "early, honest, open communication" between management
and the work force, and adoption of a "no loss of job" policy.' 7 Agreeing with labor leaders, this author suggests that the new technology
must not cost anyone their job if it will effectively integrate automotive.
Instead, reduction in the labor force must come from attrition and manjobs will be less faagement must convince laborers that the remaining
8
tiguing, higher paying and more challenging.1
Laborers have worries that go beyond economic displacement. One
of these concerns is safety. For example, workers in Chrysler Corporation's Windsor assembly plant call their 58 robot spot welders "turkeys"
because of the bobbing and pecking motion of the robots' articulated
arms as they weld roofs and body frames. Like turkeys, these robots
are notoriously stupid and do not know when to stop. This characteristic has triggered workers' fears of industrial hazard since errant robots
have mangled themselves and killed humans. 19
Statistics for robot caused injuries are inaccurate because of a disagreement over the definition of a "robot". 20 For example, industry
spokespersons claim that most accidents recently attributed to robots
were, in fact, caused by simple automated machines.21 These spokespersons obviously adopt a narrower definition of robot.
Corporate safety officers, state and federal regulators and union officials agree that safety precautions are lagging behind the overall de15. 1&
16. Robot Sabotage, TIME, Sept. 20, 1982 at 58.
17. K. SUSNJARA, A MANAGER'S GUIDE TO INDUSTRIAL ROBOTS 116 (1982).
18. IdL at 115-16.
19. Robots Seen as Posing Threat to Worker Safety, L.A. Times, Dec. 14, 1984, § IC, at
1, col. 1.
20. Id.
21. 1&
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velopment of robot technology. In response, the industry is developing
temporary rules for worker protection and permanent robot safety
guidelines. 22 The interim rules call for keeping humans out of the
robot's "work envelope". Safety devices such as stout physical barriers,
bells, whistles, blinking lights, automatic "bleeders" (which drain away
pneumatic pressure in the event of an electrical power failure) and
"light curtains" (which turn off a robot if the curtain is crossed by a
worker or another machine) have been developed to protect workers
23
from robots.
Future developments call for design standards that will make robots less hostile to people. These advances include giving robots the capacity to identify and avoid hurting humans.24
III.

THE ROBOT AS A KILLER

In the meantime, two humans have already died at the "hands" of
robots. Both incidents demonstrate the dangerous consequences of venturing too close to an apparently idle robot.
One fatality occurred at the Kawasaki Heavy Industry Plant in
Akashi City, Japan in 1981. The worker involved in the accident was
responsible for overseeing a transmission gear production process that
involved four automatic metal shaving machines and a robot that loaded
parts into the first shaver. When one of the shaving machines broke
down, it signaled the robot to assume a resting position and sent out a
call to the human technician. The technician turned off both the shaving machines and the robot while he made repairs. Upon completion of
these repairs, the worker re-activated the robot. Unexpectedly, the
robot's arm stretched out and crushed him.25

Because the accident occurred in Japan, liability was established
without litigation. In the more litigions United States, however, a simi26
lar case did make its way into court.

Unit Handling Systems, a division of Litton Industries, manufactured a five-story robot that was employed by the Ford Motor Company
for one of its casting plants. One part of the unit, one ton carts, which
were mounted on rubber wheels, delivered and retrieved castings from
high shelves inside the plant. The carts had mechanical arms to pick up
and move the castings27 .
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2, col. 2.
24. I. at 3, col. 2.
25.

I& at 2, col. 3.

26. (case cite) Author omitted citation [Ed. note]
27. Jury awards $10 Million in Killing By Robot, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1983, at 12, col.
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Robert Williams, a plant workers, climbed onto one of the upper
storage shelves to retrieve a casting because the robot had been givingworkers erroneous information about the number of parts on that shelf.
As Mr. Williams stood on the shelf, one of the carts approached without
warning and struck Williams on the head with its mechanical arm.28
At trial, Litton argued that Williams had ignored the first rule for
dealing with errant robots; he did not turn it off. Attorney Paul Rosen,
together with his associate Joan Lovel, argued the case for Williams'
widow and son. Attorneys for the deceased worker's family said that
the robot operator's manual required workers to make constant adjustments without shutting it down. Litton failed to put in a beeper warning system to alert workers when the carts began moving. Furthermore
29
they asserted that Litton's training had been tragically inadequate.
The jury quickly agreed with Rosen and Lovell. They found that
the Unit Handling System of Litton Industries was guilty of negligence
and awarded damages of ten million dollars. 30
IV.

LEGAL THEORIES FOR ROBOTIC LIABILITY
A.

THE FIRST LAW OF ROBOTICS

The robots used by both Kawasaki and Ford were simple machines.
The court in the Williams case instructed the jury to apply ordinary
negligence principles in reaching its decision. 31 In other words, the
court made no distinction between robot and other similar industrial liability cases. If robots can continue to be classified as "[m]echanical devices that can be programmed to perform some task of manipulation or
control,"3 2 the existing tort law can sufficiently deal with injuries that
result from their use, misuse, or abuse. These "robots of the first kind"
are, however, harbingers of the future.
B.

ROBOTS OF THE SECOND KIND

The development of artificial intelligence and more complex, sophisticated robots appears imminent. "Intelligent" robots, capable of
seeing, smelling, hearing and feeling are already in operation. Further28.
29.
30.
31.

Fuller, Death By Robot, OMNI, Mar. 4, 1984, at 97, 100.
Id. at 102.
Id.
(case cite from number 26) Author omitted citation [Ed. note]

32. D. TVER, ROBOTICS SOURCEBOOK AND DICTIONARY (1983). The Robot Institute of

America's 1979 definition of robots is the principally accepted industry standard. It is
stated as follows: "A robot is a reprogrammable multifunctional manipulator designed to
move materials, parts, tools or specialized devices, through variable programmed motions
for the performance of a variety of tasks." quoted in D. BERGER, THE STATE-OF-THE-ART
ROBOT CATALOGUE 1 (1984).
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more, experimental robots capable of learning and acting independently
have been built and will make their commercial debutes in a few
33
years.
One commentator reports that "[flrom 1985 to 1990, robots will
come into widespread use in spraying insecticide on farms, spreading
fertilizer, inspecting eggs and packing them, milking cows, cutting lumber, planting and in ocean research." 34 The Japanese Ministry of Trade
and Industry recently announced that it would undertake an eight-year,
$85 million dollar project to build so-called "super robots." These robots would be able to carry out dangerous tasks such as fighting fires,
maintaining nuclear power plants and working on the oceans' floors.35
Manufacturers in both the United States and Japan will soon be marketing a robot capable of "snaking" through pipes to inspect remote areas of power plants for cracks and flaws. Westinghouse is working on
an advanced "snake" robot that will have gripping devices for walking
up poles. Carnegie-Mellon University is designing a robot to do "roofbolting" in mines, which is considered one of the industry's most dan36
gerous tasks.
These robots of the second kind are best defined as sensory machines capable of reprogramming themselves to deal with problems. To
the extent that they are capable (or allowed) to reprogram themselves,
these machines can choose between alternatives or "think".
While these machines are coming off the drawing boards, a debate
still exists as to whether robots can actually "think." Joseph Engelberger, who is sometimes called the "father of robotics", believes
that robots can never possess human "judgment." He states "[w]ork
that is changeable, varied, creative and unstructured will always be
37
done by humans.
But most who have studied or queried the future of robots have no
doubt that the machines can learn and use judgment. The limit that
some prognosticators envision is that humans "can never construct a
genuine emotional brain in an artifact. 3 8s In other words, this class of
33. See A. COLE,THE SEARCH FOR ROBOTS 80-98 (1967), discussing one such machine.

See also, Robots, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 21, 1981, at 92, discussing the status of intelligent

robots.
34. P. BERGER, supra note 32, at 144, quoting the Japan Industrial Robot Association.
35. Id
36. Armstrong, Hard Hat Robots May Take Risk Out of Dangerous Jobs, CHRISTIAN
SCIENTIST MONITOR, Aug. 30, 1983, at 6, col. 4.

37. From Garbage Collection to Brain Surgery With Robots, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 5, 1983, at 64. See also H. DREYFUS, WHAT COMPUTERS CAN'T Do: A CRITIQUE
OF ARTIFICIAL REASON 197-217 (1957).
38. M. THRING, supra note 2, at 26; R. ULLRICH, THE ROBOTICS PRIMER 104 (1983)
stating that the threat of the computer revolution can be avoided by "know[ing] things
that the computer can never learn[.]"
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robots will lack "religious feelings, value judgments, conscience[s] and
morality. ' 's 9
It is this lack of morality that scares some commentators. One
writes, "Mhese robots must be subjugated to regulation, because of
their potential for doing harm to the human species. Their design must
be supervised and their size restricted."' 4
The basic rules for designing such a subjugated robot were worked
out in 1950 by Isaac Asimov, then a teenage science fiction writer. His
"Three Laws of Robotics" are still popular with science fiction writers,
readers, and roboticists who fear these technological creatures.
Asimov's declares that:
1. A robot must not harm a human being, nor through inaction, allow
one to come to harm.
2. A robot must always obey human beings, unless that is in conflict
with the first law.
3. A robot must protect itself from
harm, unless that is in conflict
41
with the first or second laws.
Although Asimov's Laws leave much to be interpreted by the
amoral and non-thinking robot (e.g. the meaning of "harm," or how the
robot is to treat animals, extraterrestrials, and other robots), 42 the writers who most fear robots for being amoral and nonthinking are the first
to quote Asimov.43 Professor Thring, at Queens College, London has
gone so far as to equate Asimov's laws with his own "Two Law of Impotence for Robots". Thring's laws, unlike Asimov's, are attempts to describe what he considers to be the inherent limitations of all robots.
Briefly his laws state that (1) A robot can only do what its human
programmer designed it to do and never more; and (2) A robot can
never have true human emotions."
39. M. THRING, supra note 2,at 26.
40. A. COTE,THE SEARCH FOR THE ROBOTS 222-23 (1967).

41. I. AsIMOV, I, ROBOT 51 (1950).

See also Asimov, forward to J. ENGELBERGER,

ROBOTICS IN PRACTICE at xiii (1980) for a statement of Asimov's continued belief in the

limited capacity of robots and the viability of his "three laws."
42. The limited applicability of Asimov's laws can be seen from the following scenario: Robby, an Asimovian programmed robot, is stationed on a spaceship with a crew of
ten humans and a pet dog. Robby is the only occupant with a complete map to get the
crew home. Robby is first confronted by the dog. It intrinsically dislikes robots and
growls threateningly. Next, an extraterrestrial appears and seems ready to decapitate
Robby; in reality, it is making a friendly greeting. Finally, Robby is ordered to self-destruct the deranged human janitor in the crew.
Following Asmovian rules, Robby steps on the dog's head, zaps the extraterrestrial
with a laser, and destroys itself. Alas, the petless crew is stranded in space and, in all
probability is pursued by the vengeful comrades of the deceased extraterrestrial.
43. See J. YOUNG, ROBOTICS 3 (1973); J. ENGELBERGER, supra note 41, at 89, 118, 125;
M. THRING, supra note 2, at 27.
44. M. THRING, supra note 2, at 27-8.
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Given these laws, robots are only suitable to be servants, and rather
dumb servants at that. Philosopher Mortimer Taube agrees. He argues
that humans have a peculiar "feeling" or "aesthetic" that scientists can
never give to mere machines.4
Another commentator states, "The robot is a machine. Let no one
doubt that .... ,46s
In his view, the robot is destined to be nothing more
than a machine; a slave to mankind for all times. He also predicts that,
in all probability, "some humans will adopt them as domestic pets, since
47
this is the nature of human beings."
It is hard to think of a statement that could be more condescending
or presumptuous than this last one. One must wonder if these commentators' underlying fears of robot revolt will ever come to pass. Professor
John McCarthy at Stanford University, suggests that revolt will never
happen because "[w]e'll probably never want to deal with machines that
are too much like us."4 But he discourages programmers to "think of
their programs as a servant, whose master, the user, should be able to
'49
control it."
A related fear is that robots will eventually reproduce. One commentator states that, "If such self-replicating machines were also endowed with artificial intelligence of an advanced nature, society will be
faced with a new challenge: What do humans do to guard against domination by intelligent machines?" ° Another commentator predicts that
we may see self-reproducing robots with 20 years. 51
"Many people have a deeply held belief that no object or animal should
be able to replace a human being in a person's life ....

Yet another

commentator suggests that this fear of robots may be sexually based. It
may be felt that there is a sanctity about human relationships that renders them beyond artificial simulation, but arguments of this kind cannot rule out the psychological possibility that a person may, in fact,
come to regard a nonhuman object as an adequate substitute for a
human friend. It is clear, for example, that some people set the value
of their relationship with an animal above that of any human alliance,
and the possibility that a computer might achieve such
favor cannot be
52
rejected merely on the grounds that it is not human.
45. M.
117 (1961).

TAUBE, COMPUTERS AND COMMON SENSE: THE MYTH OF THINKING MACHINES

46. J. YOUNG, "UPra note 43, at 292.

47. Id,
48. McCarthy, The Little Thoughts of Thinking Machines PSYCHOLOGY
1983, at 49.
49. 1&

TODAY,

Dec.

50. R. DORF, ROBOTS AND AUTOMATED MANUFACTURING 177 (1983).

51. R. ULLRICH, supra note 38, at 7 quoting Georg Von Tiesenhausen of NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center.
52. Frude, The Affectionale Machine, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Dec. 1983, at 23.
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He concludes that despite this apparent distaste for robots, more
widespread usage and developments will force operators to face their
fears.

53

Anthropologist Morton Klass of Columbia University does not believe that society (as reflected in the science fiction stories he has studied) sees robots as a sexual threat. "[A]lithough we see in the robot a
potential threat to our well-being, that threat is almost never a sexual
one... ."54 In fact, he concludes that the absence of this sexual fear, as
portrayed in the literature of the 1940's and 50's was critical in transforming readers' views "from an infernal danger into something to
which we respond with pleasure and affection.""
C.

ROBOTS OF THE THIRD KIND

It has been predicted that by the turn of the century, robot designers will be able to develop an electronic machine which will be capable,
in terms of its capacity, structure and complexity, of operating like a
human brain.5
Unlike those who see only robots of the second kind in mankind's
future, Aleksander and Burnett do not fear the coming of the "millenial" robot. 57 Rather, they compare the emergence of these robots of
the future to the birth of a child. In fact, they consider these machines
"children of our brains." s Alfred Cote, who also envisions the arrival
of this third generation, agrees. "[T]hey'll be no more [a] threat to
man's survival," he writes, "than today's machines are-provided that
man continues to compete with them." 59 If however, society becomes
lazy and does not improve itself, it will subject itself to control by these
mechanical devices.60Those who advocate that robots of the third kind (i.e., "manufactured equivalents of humans"'6 1 ) will eventually be produced seem to
53. Id.at 24.

54. Klass, The Art~icial alien: Transformationsof the Robot in Science Fiction, 470
ANNALS 171, 176 (1983).
55. Id.
56. I. ALEKSANDER & P. BuRNE'r, REINVENTING MAN: THE ROBOT BECOMES REALrrY
281 (1983). See also Gunderson, The Imitation Game, in MINDS AND MACHINES 61 (A. Anderson ed. 1964) quoting A.M. Turing, father of the thinking robot who, in 1950, stated,
I believe that in fifty years' time it will be possible to program computers, with a
storage capacity of 10', to make them play the imitation game so well that an average interrogator will not have more than 70 per cent chance of making the
right identification [between robot and human] after five minutes of questioning.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

ALEKSANDER & BURNETT, supra note 56, at 61.
Id
A. CoLE, supra note 33, at 224.
Id.
Klass, supra note 54, at 172.
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have the better argument because it is not based on theology or fear of
the unknown.
The first philosopher to adequately develop an argument in support
of the human-robot was A.M. Turing. He argued that machines could
be created to exactly imitate humans. Such a machine would respond
with the same degree of error that a human would. Under any test, its
brain's capabilities and capacity would be indistinguishable from the
human brain. Absent any way of distinguishing the robot brain from
that of the human, Turing concluded that the former must be regarded
62
as equivalent to the latter. 63
In 1979, F.H. George, the director of the Institute of Cybernetics at
Brunnel University, England, reviewed all arguments made against
robot-humans. He concluded that there is no reason why these machines cannot be designed to think.
Prior to this analysis, philosopher Hilary Putnam made an equally
detailed review of the arguments against robot-humans. One widely
held argument is worth reviewing. It is the argument that we cannot
tell whether robots are living, therefore we should treat them as if they
were non-human. Putnam, however, points out that same argument
can be made with respect to humans.6 In other words, we believe
other humans are living because they act similarly to ourselves. If this
assumption is true, a similar argument can be made for robots; especially ones that are created as androids which resemble humans in ap65
pearance and touch.
Putnam also raises the possibility that even though one robot who
creates other robots may regard itself as a conscious creator, it may also
consider its creations as lifeless. She points out that "our position with
respect to robots is exactly that of robots with respect to [other
robots]. 66
John Anderson, a professor psychology and computer science at
Carnegie-Mellon University, observed in 1983 that computer capabilities
are no longer seen as intelligent even though the machines may be able
to outperform humans. As a result, these tasks are no longer seen as an
67
indicator of human intelligence.
62. See A. Turing, Computer Machinery and Intelligence, MIND, Oct. 1950, 433-460.

But cf. Ziff, The Feelings of Robots, ANALYSIS 98 (1959) for a response to Turing's argument. Ziff argues that Turing's robots were only giving performances which could not be
distinguished from reality.
63. F. GEORGE, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 147 (1979).

64. H. Putnam, Robots: Machines of Artificially Created Life? 61 J. OF PHILOSOPHY
668, 689 (1964).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Huyghe, Of Two Minds, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Dec. 1983, at 32.
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Professor Thring's argument that robots can never be endowed
with emotion 6s is rejected by M.I.T. Professor Marvin Minsky who is regarded as one of the chief architects of artificial intelligence. He states
that "[i]t is a mistake in our culture that feeling and emotion are deep,
whereas intelligence, how we get ideas, is easy to understand. ' 69 He
feels that humans can effectively comprehend the dynamics of emotions, and concludes that humans can also program robots so that they
can display emotion. He writes: "[o]nce we can get a certain amount of
thought, and we've decided which emotions we want in a machine, that
70
it won't be hard to do."
With regard to the question of whether a robot is a machine or artificially created life Putnam thinks that the situation "calls for a decision and not for a discovery. If we are to make a decision it seems
preferable .. . to extend our concept so that robots are conscious - for
'discrimination' based on the 'softness' or 'hardness' of the body parts of
a synthetic 'organism' seems as silly as discriminatory treatment of
71
humans on the basis of skin color. (emphasis added)"
This discrimination consciousness of robots logically leads to the
discussion of equality for the mechanical creations. In 1972, William
Lycan, an associate professor of philosophy at Ohio State University, delivered a lecture on the civil rights of robots. He defined a robot as being a manufactured android, but otherwise indistinguishable from man.
As an example, he described a fictional robot named Harry "who can
converse intelligently on all sorts of subjects, play golf, write passable
poetry, control his occasional nervousness pretty well, make passionate
love, prove mathematical theorems, attend political rallies with enthusiasm, show envy when outdone, throw gin bottles at annoying children,
72
etc."
He pointed out two differences between Harry and a human:
(1) Harry was an artifact, and (2) Harry was made partly or entirely of
hardware. Lycum concluded, however, this distinction is not a sound
basis for denying Harry equal treatment. He argued, "If we object to
racial and/or ethnic discrimination in our present society, we should ob73
ject to discrimination against harry on the basis of his birth place.
68. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
69. Huyghe, supra note 67, at 32.
70. Id.
71. Putnam, supra note 64, at 691.
72. Speech by W. Lycum, The Civil rights of Robots, at Kansas State University (Oct.
1972) quoted in part in J. REICHARipr, Robots: Fact, Fiction and Prediction 162 (1978).
73. Id.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

D.

[Vol. VIII

ROBOTS OF THE FouRTH KIND

Professor Lycan suggests that it is possible that "two or more extremely intelligent and sensitive beings, who were created by humans,
could themselves build a super-being who was so superior in every way
'74
to humans that it could never have been created by them.
If we failed to treat robots of the third kind like humans, how will
robot-gods treat us? Aleksander and Burnett ask, "Has man not, by a
process of LaMarckian evolution, produced his own successor and, if we
hold to the principle that we use to justify our own authoritarian attitudes toward nature, would we not be bound to step aside and make
way for the superior being?" 75 Richard Dorf properly asks, "What do
humans do to guard against domination by intelligent machines?" 76 For
scientists, writers and philosophers, this has been an issue for more
than fifty years. If futurists are correct, it will be an issue for the legal
community before the end of the century.
In 1964, one commentator identified the problem with trying to ignore the issue. He wrote:
A goal seeking mechanism will not necessarily seek our goals unless
we design it for that purpose and, in that designing, we must foresee all
steps of the process for which it is designed .... The penalties for er-

rors of foresight, great as they are now, 7will
be enormously increased
7
as automatization comes into its full use.

IV.

DEVELOPING A JUS ROBOTICUM

Both the roboticists and philosophers have presented society with a
challenge: how should we treat robots? Not only must society develop
treatment for today's robots but it must adopt one for robots of the year
2000 and beyond. Guidelines, rules and laws must be laid down and undoubtedly the legal community will be called upon to help.
As indicated above, ordinary tort principles of intent, negligence
and strict liability do, and will, properly govern injuries produced by robots of the first kind, which are simple reprogrammable automatic machines presently among us. Robots of the second kind, such as those
with human specified limits, logically should be governed by the same
law, possibly with one major caveat. The reprogramming of an errant
robot of the second kind must be mandatory.
Even if robots of the third kind, the robot-persons, never come into
being, it seems ethically and morally essential that we should be able to
distinguish them from lesser robots. If we do not, the nagging fear of
74. 1&
75. 1. ALEKsANDER & P. BuRNETr, supra note 56, at 162.
76. R. DORF, ROBOTIcS AND AUTOMATED MANUFACTURING 177 (1983).
77. N. WEINER, GOD AND GOLEM, INC. 63 (1964).
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revolt and domination will continue to haunt mankind. But how does
one distinguish a robot from a robot-human? In other words, what are
the peculiar traits of humans that robots must attain to be classified as a
quasi-human? To determine this, society must first decide which char78
acteristics are inherently human.
For more than a century, Anglo-American law has struggled with
at least part of the problem in a slightly different context. Instead of
attempting to upgrade a mechanical being to a state of humanity, it has
devised a test for lowering a human to a state of incipience. It has
adopted the insanity test. As currently set forth in the Model Penal
Code, insanity is the incapacity to either appreciate wrongfulness or
conform to the requirements of the law. 79 A possible "sanity" test for
robots would mirror this test. In other words, sanity could be defined as
the capacity to appreciate what is lawful and proper in human society
and the ability to conform to the requirements of the law. This, however, is obviously an inadequate test of humanity. Even the simplest of
intermediate robots could be programmed to identify the general principles of law governing a society and to conform to them. Modern computers, in fact, can readily regurgitate statements of the law. Yet,
because they lack mobility and any independent intellectual capacity,
they are incapable of causing harm. While they may be "sane" they are
certainly not human.
Julien Offray de La Mettrie, writing in 1747, suggested that man is
a machine constructed in such a way that it is not possible to exactly
define or describe him.8 0 Since no one has exactly described man,
maybe La Mettrie is correct. Nevertheless, there seems to be some basic characteristics, (which can be borrowed from philosophers who have
tried to differentiate man and robot), that will lead us toward a correct
response. In the form of a simple test, these characteristics can be set
out as follows:
1. Does it/he/she have a complex brain?
2. Is the brain capable of speculation, calculation and memory, in addition to the operation of sub-system or body parts?
78. Cf. J. REIcHARDT, supra note 72, at 161 quoting R. Buckminster Fuller, who
rather facetiously defines a human as:
a self balancing, 28-jointed adapter-base biped; an electrochemical reduction
plant, integral with segregated storages of special energy extract in storage batteries for subsequent actuation of thousands of hydraulic and pneumatic pumps
with motors attached; 62,000 miles of capilaries ....
The whole, extraordinary
complex mechanism guided with exquisite precision from a turret in which are
located telescopic and microscopic self registering and recording range finders, a
spectroscope, etc.; the turret control being closely allied with the air-conditioning
intake -and- exhaust, and a main fuel intake ....
79. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).

80. See J. LA METRiE, L'HoMME MACHINE (1747).

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. VIII

3.

Is the brain's capacity for speculation, calculation and memory comparable to that of a human?
4. Is the brain capable of learning, i.e., can it separate potentially useful information from useless information, and can it purge or discard the useless?
5. Is the brain's capacity to learn unlimited by subject matter, i.e., is it
capable of invention?
6. Is the brain capable of using sensory devices to perceive its environment and to interface with humans even if those sensory devices
are not connected?
Assuming a robot can "pass" this test and the sanity test as well, it
seems logically, ethically and morally compelling not only to regard it
as both human and sane, but also entitled to the rights of other "natural", humans.
V.

CONCLUSION

Establishing that robot-humans can exist (assuming that we accept
the argument that they can) merely leads us to more fundamental and
pragmatic questions. First, should they be allowed to exist? If those
who fear intelligent robots are right, should not every robot be
programmed to function in accordance with Asimov's second law: total
obedience to humans?
On the other hand, is such a law ever totally effective? Assuming
such a requirement were established, but it proved ineffective, would it
not produce exactly what it was meant to prevent, namely revolt and
domination?
Fear and historic discrimination against the unusual would demand
that we make robot-humans our slaves. Logic, ethics and open-minded
morality dictate that we give robot-humans equal rights with humans.
This first question of robot existence lead us to the second, more
pragmatic problem. If robot-humans are given human rights in our private-property conscious society, who is to pay for their freedom? For
those who are certain that robots are subject to certain natural laws of
"impotence" that will never allow them to attain human status, these
issues are nonsense. But for those who disagree, (and even those who
are uncertain) these issues are both real and imminent.

